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THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE ON SEXUAL

INEQUALITY. By Sandra Lipsitz Bem. New Haven: Yale University
Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 244. $30.
A pale eggy yellow background. Circles of different dingy colors
- murky avocado green, rusty orange, dull burnt sienna, and opaque
sapphire blue, overlapping in parts to create smoggy brownish colors.
Is this a dress worn by Marcia Brady circa 1974? A retro Venn diagram? No, it is the cover design of The Lenses of Gender. Sandra
Lipsitz Bem, 1 who was a scholar of androgyny in the 1970s,2 dresses
her book in androgynous 1970s fashion. 3 In this book, she attempts to
move beyond the concept of 1970s androgyny toward a broader, modem theory of cultural androcentrism, a concept she labels "gender
schema theory." Her broad-ranging theory encompasses multidisciplinary fields such as biology, psychology, sociology, history, economics, politics, and law. In her preface, she acknowledges the risks
of writing a book with such a comprehensive goal: "Because I poach
on the domains of other specialists, my rendition of their discourse
may seem unoriginal; on some occasions, it may not even ring true to
their ears" (p. ix). Although the book does at times seem unoriginal
- even somewhat outdated4 - and at times gives cursory treatment
of vast subjects, Bern does supply a new framework, or at least a new
vocabulary, for understanding the oppression of women and sexual
minorities.
The title of the book gives us the first component of Bern's new
vocabulary- the three "lenses of gender." According to Bem, we see
the world through various "lenses," which are "hidden assumptions
about sex and gender [that] remain embedded in cultural discourses,
1. Professor of Psychology and Women's Studies, Cornell University.
2. See p. viii; see, e.g., Sandra Lipsitz Bern, On the Utility ofAlternative Procedures for Assessing Psychological Androgyny, 45 J. CoNSULTING & CLINICAL PsYCHOL. 196 (1977) [hereinafter
Bern, Utility]; Sandra Lipsitz Bern, Sex Role Adaptability: One Consequence of Psychological
Androgyny, 31 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 634 (1975); Sandra Lipsitz Bern, The Measurement ofPsychological Androgyny, 42 J. CoNSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 155 (1974) [hereinafter Bern, The Measurement of Psychological Androgyny].
3. This is in contrast to the many recent "women's books" that come dressed in feminine
colors, such as pinks, lavenders, purples, and burgundies. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON,
VALUE IN ETHICS AND EcONOMICS (1993) (mauve and lavender); RENEE R. ANSPACH, DECIDING WHO LIVES: FATEFUL CHOICES IN THE INTENSIVE-CARE NURSERY (1993) (lavender and
rose); ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW (1988) (burgundy). But see
ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE COLOR OF GENDER: REIMAGING DEMOCRACY (1994) (play-figure woman dressed in blue, red, fuchsia, mustard, and black, but wearing a dress).
4. Bern's theory, especially the lens of androcentrism, seems particularly outdated and unoriginal when compared with Catharine MacKinnon's work over the past fifteen years. In this
book, however, Bern adds her significant psychological work on gender schematicity and androgyny to MacKinnon's sociolegal theories, thus giving a psychological framework to what legal
scholars would otherwise recognize as MacKinnon's dominance theory. See infra note 6.
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social institutions, and individual psyches" (p. 2). These lenses are (i)
androcentrism, (ii) gender polarization, and (iii) biological essentialism. She calls them "lenses" because we are raised with them and we
assume that we are seeing the only possible reality when we look
through them, but if we learn to remove the lenses, we can see a different construction of reality. 5 The lenses of gender are problematic because they "invisibly and systemically reproduce male power in
generation after generation" (p. 2). One of the goals of Bem's book is
to teach us to recognize the lenses of gender in ourselves, thus enabling
us to look at the lenses of gender rather than through them. This ability requires a "raised social consciousness" (p. 1) that allows us to
recognize the ways in which gender as a social construction shapes our
views of social reality. Exposing the lenses of gender, Bern argues, will
transform the sex equality movement (p. 176). The end result of this
raised consciousness, to which Bern aspires, would be a shift in the
feminist debate away from the focus on differences between men and
women, and toward a focus on the way in which "androcentric social
institutions transform male-female difference into female disadvantage" (p. 177). As Bern acknowledges (pp. xi, 183-84), feminist legal
scholar Catharine MacKinnon has been making this same argument
since the late 1970s.6
S. Bern describes the effects of our enculturation in the following way:
[T]he hallmark of a native consciousness is not being able to distinguish between reality and
the way one's culture construes reality; in other words, the reality one perceives and the
cultural lenses through which one perceives it are "indissoluble." • • • [T]he child growing
up within a culture is thus like the proverbial fish who is unaware that its environment is
wet. After all, what else could it be?
P. 140 (quoting CLIFFORD GEERTZ, "From the Native's Point of View''..- On the Nature of An·
thropological Understanding. in LoCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER EssAYS IN INTERPRETIVE AN·
THROPOLOGY SS, SS (1983)).
6. Bern's shift from difference to androcentrism parallels MacKinnon's shift from difference
to dominance. For example, in one of her more recent works, MacKinnon writes: "In this
approach, inequality is a matter not of sameness and difference, but of dominance and subordination..•. Keeping the reality of gender in view makes it impossible to see gender as a difference
•.••" CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMIN15f THEORY OF THE STATE 242-43
(1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINl5f THEORY OF THE STATE]. See generally
id. at 21S-49; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Introduction: The Art ofthe Impossible [hereinafter
MACKINNON, Art of the Impossible], in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 1, 8-10 (1987); CATHARINE
MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance [hereinafter MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance],
in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra, at 32. She also writes, "If you follow my shift in perspective
from gender as difference to gender as dominance, gender changes from a distinction that is
presumptively valid to a detriment that is presumptively suspect. The difference approach tries
to map reality; the dominance approach tries to challenge and change it." Id. at 44. In an earlier
work, she notes,
It is as much the social creation of differences, and the transformation of differences into
social advantages and disadvantages, upon which inequality can rationally be predicated•••.
Sex discrimination is treated as a logical and necessary outgrowth of a social whole in
which the human sex difference has been transformed into a systematic social inequality for the benefit of some, to the detriment of others.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN lOS, 126·27 (1979)
[hereinafter MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT]. See generally id. at 101-41.
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The first lens of gender is androcentrism, or male-centeredness (pp.
39-79):
[A]ndrocentrism is the privileging of male experience and the "otherizing" of female experience; that is, males and male experience are treated
as a neutral standard or norm for the culture or the species as a whole,
and females and female experience are treated as a sex-specific deviation
from that allegedly universal standard. [p. 41]

Bern surveys various cultural discourses - theology, philosophy, psychology, and law - pointing out the androcentrism in each area. Her
analysis of equal rights law (pp. 62-79) reads like the text to an introductory undergraduate course on the history of women and the law.
She easily flips through the infamous early cases - Bradwell v. 11/inois 1 and Muller v. Oregon 8 - the leading 1970s equality cases -

Reed v. Reed, 9 Frontiero v. Richardson, 1° Craig v. Boren, 11 Geduldig v.
Aiello, 12 General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 13 and Personnel Administrator
v. Feeney 14 - and the "comparable worth" case - AFSCME v.
Washington. 15 The last case, AFSCME v. Washington, is the only case
she cites that was decided after the 1970s. Bern gives cursory treatment to the cases and to the feminist strategies that went into them,
using the cases only to prove her point - that the law is androcentric.
Bern also criticizes the predominant feminist legal strategy that framed
the 1970s cases - gender neutrality - without mentioning the expansive debate over the issue, through which many feminists have come to
the conclusion that gender neutrality is not the best feminist legal
strategy. 16 Put simply, Bern chooses an easy target and then makes it
look even easier. Although the cases she cites clearly do demonstrate
androcentrism in the legal system, she could have added dimension to
the examples by expounding on the feminist discourse that went into
the cases and came after them and by drawing on some of the more
recent controversial focal areas of feminist legal strategy, such as sexuality, sexual harassment, pornography, prostitution, surrogacy, incest,
7. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.} 130 (1873); see pp. 66-68.
8. 208 U.S. 412 (1908); see pp. 67-70.
9. 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see pp. 70-71.
10. 411 U.S. 677 (1973); see pp. 71-73.
11. 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see pp. 72-73.
12. 417 U.S. 484 (1974); see pp. 74-77.
13. 429 U.S. 125 (1976); see pp. 74-77.
14. 442 U.S. 256 (1979); see p. 77.
15. 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985); see pp 77-78.
16. See, e.g., MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance, supra note 6, at 33-34; MACKINNON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 6, at 106-18; Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy,
Introduction to FEMINISf LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 1, 5.7 (Katharine
T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersec-

tion of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory
and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87
MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175 (1982).
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battery, and rape. Overall, however, Bern's discussion of androcentrism proves, to anyone who has not already figured it out, that our
institutions and fields of thought are defined and function from a male
point of view.
The second lens is gender polarization (pp. 80-132), or "the ubiquitous organization of social life around the distinction between male
and female" (p. 80). This lens polarizes men and women so that we
appear to have vast differences in many aspects of life, such as biology,
modes of dress, social roles, emotions, and sexual desires (p. 2). This
lens is also the reason why people generally perceive that there are
only two sexes. 17 Bern begins her analysis of gender polarization by
focusing on the way in which scientists have contributed to gender
polarization by stigmatizing homosexuality as a sexual "deviation.,,
She examines the late-nineteenth-century concept of sexual inversion,
Freud's views on homosexuality, and American psychiatrists' pathologizing of homosexuality (pp. 87-101). She concludes that homosexual oppression is a result of gender polarization and compulsory
heterosexuality. 18
Bern then analyzes scientific studies that focus on what she calls
the "nonsexual" masculinity-femininity of the individual psyche "the assessment of masculinity-femininity, the treatment and prevention of masculinity-femininity disorders, especially 'transsexualism,'
and the development of masculinity-femininity in 'normal' children"
(pp. 101-02). At this point, Bern includes the results of an interesting
study she did to test children's understanding of gender as a biological
concept. 19 Bern showed fifty-eight children (three-, four-, and fiveyear-olds) a photograph of a nude toddler. She then asked the children to identify the sex of that same toddler in two other pictures one in which the toddler is dressed in a sex-consistent way, and one in
which the toddler is cross-dressed.20 The children's responses to the
test showed whether they understood that gender is based on genitalia
or whether they thought that gender is based on dress or hairstyle.
Sixty percent of the children in the study misidentified the gender of
the toddler, failing the test. 21 Bern argues that this lack of biological
gender knowledge leads to gender traditionalism and gender polarization because children grow up thinking that there are certain things
that they must do in order to be male or female. Bern explains:
17. P. 80; see also MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note
6, at 233 ("Sex in nature is not a bipolarity, it is a continuum; society makes it into a
bipolarity.").
18. P. 101. See generally Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence,
5 SIGNS 631 (1980).
19. Sandra Lipsitz Bern, Genital Knowledge and Gender Constancy in Preschool Children, 60
CHILD DEV. 649 (1989); see pp. 115-17.
20. See pp. 116-17 (reprinting photographs used in the study).
21. Bern, supra note 19, at 660-62.
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As I see it, the legacy of learning a social definition of sex lasts long
after a child has learned about the special significance of the genitalia as
the defining attributes of male and female. Not only does the social definition set up a pattern of behavior that is culturally consistent with
whatever sex the child is told he or she is; it also instills in the child the
never-to-be-fully-forgotten feeling that being male or female is something
to work at, to accomplish, and to be sure not to lose, rather than something one is biologically. [p. 148]

Bern concludes that much of the previous psychological and psychiatric discourse contributes to gender polarization by privileging
gender traditionalism and pathologizing gender "deviance" according
to cultural standards (p. 115). Bern and other feminist psychologists
began to challenge this discourse in the 1970s. Bern originally focused
on the area of androgyny but soon came to recognize the limitations of
that concept as a vehicle for social and political change. Feminist theorists at the time criticized the concept of androgyny as being "simultaneously so gender neutral, so utopian, and so devoid of any real
connection to historical reality that it doesn't even acknowledge the
existence of gender inequality" (p. 123). They also criticized androgyny for being "too private and too personal . . . to be of any value
politically" and for reproducing the gender polarity that it sought to
undercut. 22 Bern herself, while clinging to the idea that androgyny has
value as a vision of utopia (p. 124), has shifted the focus of her research from androgyny to the concept of gender schematicity (p. 125).
Bern best defines and explains the gender schema theory for scholars outside the field of psychology in her article, Gender Schema Theory and Its Implications for Child Development: Raising Genderaschematic Children in a Gender-schematic Society. 23 Gender schema
theory provides an explanation for "sex typing," or the way in which
children become masculine or feminine by acquiring sex-appropriate
preferences, skills, personality attributes, behaviors, and self-concepts.24 "[G]ender schema theory proposes that sex typing derives in
large measure from gender-schematic processing, from a generalized
readiness on the part of the child to encode and to organize information - including information about the self - according to the culture's definitions of maleness and femaleness." 25 Bern explains that
children learn society's cultural definitions of maleness and femaleness
as a schema. 26 Sex typing results as children internalize the schema
22. P. 123. For a critique of androgyny from a legal perspective, see Christine A. Littleton,

Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 15 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1292-95 (1987).
23. Sandra Lipsitz Bern, Gender Schema Theory and Its Implications for Child Development:
Raising Gender-aschematic Children in a Gender-schematic Society, 8 SIGNS 598 (1983).
24. Id. at 598.
25. Id. at 603.
26. Bern defines schema as:
a cognitive structure, a network of associations that organizes and guides an individual's
perception. A schema functions as an anticipatory structure, a readiness to search for and
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and develop a gendered self-concept, thus becoming gender schematic
without even realizing it (p. 125). Once children internalize the gender schema, they begin to evaluate themselves on the basis of gendered
criteria. 27
[T]he child also learns to evaluate his or her adequacy as a person according to the gender schema . . . . The gender schema becomes a prescriptive standard or guide, and self-esteem becomes its hostage. Here,
then, enters an internalized motivational factor that prompts an individual to regulate his or her behavior so that it conforms to cultural definitions of femaleness and maleness. Thus do cultural myths become selffulfilling prophecies, and thus, according to gender schema theory, do we
arrive at the phenomenon known as sex typing. 28

Once the child becomes sex typed, he or she will sort information and
make decisions based on gender classifications and on the schema's
definitions of what is appropriate masculinity or femininity, rather
than on other factors that could work equally well (pp. 125-27).
Bern expands on the gender schema theory in The Lenses of Gender (pp. 125-27, 138-75). She takes her original gender schema theory
and adds to it the lens of androcentrism. She also places new emphasis
on how the process of enculturation transfers the gender schema from
the culture to the individual psyche (p. 139). This theory explains how
and why men and women in our society become androcentric and gender-polarizing themselves and then unwittingly collaborate in the reproduction of male power. 2 9
The third lens is biological essentialism, which works to rationalize
the other two lenses by claiming that there is a clear biological reason
for all the differences between men and women (pp. 2, 6-38). Bern
to assimilate incoming information in schema-relevant terms. Schematic information
processing is thus highly selective and enables the individual to impose structure and meaning onto a vast array of incoming stimuli. More specifically, schematic information processing entails a readiness to sort information into categories on the basis of some particular
dimension, despite the existence of other dimensions that could serve equally well in this
regard.
Id. at 603-04.
27. In order to identify such sex-typed individuals, Bern created the Bern Sex Role Inventory
(BSRI). See pp. 118-20; Bern, Utility, supra note 2, at 196-97; Bern, The Measurement of
Psychological Androgyny, supra note 2. The BSRI contains a list of positive personality characteristics, some that are considered "masculine" - for example, assertiveness and independence
- and some that are considered "feminine" - for example, tenderness and understanding according to American cultural definitions of sex appropriateness. The person taking the BSRI
indicates how well each of the personality characteristics describes himself or herself. After the
BSRI is scored, the person receives a Masculinity Score and a Femininity Score. If the Masculinity Score is higher, the person is said to have a masculine sex role; if the Femininity Score is
higher, the person is said to have a feminine sex role. If the Masculinity and the Femininity
Scores are approximately equal, then the person is said to have an androgynous sex role. Pp.
119-20; Bern, Utility, supra note 2, at 197.
28. Bern, supra note 23, at 604-05 (footnote omitted).
29. See also MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 6, at
230 ("The distinction between women and men is not simply etched onto perceived reality, but
superimposed on a picture that already exists in the mind because it exists in the social world.").
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places this section first in her book because "Westem culture has for
so long analyzed almost all issues related to women and men in terms
of biological difference that this cultural concern with biology must be
laid to rest before I can go on with my story" (pp. 3-4). Bern points
out the way in which science has worked "to rationalize and legitimize
the sexual status quo" throughout history and through recent sociobiological theories (p. 6). She criticizes sociobiologists and biopsychologists for underestimating the influence of culture and situational
context on the individual and for overestimating the importance of the
individual's biology. Bern then offers her own biohistorical account of
sexual difference and sexual inequality. She theorizes that men and
women developed a gendered division of labor in hunter-gatherer societies because women had to deal with the biological reality of being
pregnant or breastfeeding for most of their adult lives. Men, who were
responsible for defense and hunting, developed male-dominated political institutions, while women were busy raising children and doing
whatever other productive activities they could do with children
"either in them or on them" (p. 31). The big question, according to
Bern, is why these inequalities still exist, given that in technologically
advanced societies women are no longer constrained by their fertility.
She concludes that history has so firmly entrenched male political
dominance that modem cultural institutions continue to enforce the
division of labor through seemingly neutral means - for example, by
making it extremely difficult in our society to be both a parent and a
worker in the paid labor force (pp. 32-33). Bern succinctly states her
final opinion on the biology issue: "[N]o matter what subtle biological
differences there may someday prove to be between women and men
on the average, those differences will never justify the sexual inequality
that has, for centuries, been a feature of human social life." 30
One main criticism of The Lenses of Gender is that Bern rarely
discusses the development of women's sexuality, especially through
sexual abuse, as a part of the gender schema leading to women's inequality. She gives a cursory discussion of marital rape (p. 145), violence against women (p. 163), and the eroticization of sexual
inequality (pp. 163-64), and she briefly lists prostitution, stripping, and
go-go dancing as "women's jobs" (p. 144). The omission of a more
detailed discussion of the development of women's sexuality, however,
is somewhat odd considering the prominence of the idea that inequality on the basis of sexuality is a major part of gender inequality. 31
30. P. 38; cf. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 6.
To the extent that the biology of one sex is a social disadvantage, while the biology of the
other is not, or is a social advantage, the sexes are equally different but not equally powerful.
The issue becomes the social meaning of biology, not any facticity or object quality of biology itself.
Id. at 232.
31. See, e.g., SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? 261-63 (1991);
MACKINNON, SEXUAL lIARAssMENT, supra note 6; Kimberle Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Any-
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Catharine MacKinnon theorizes:
Sexuality, then, is a form of power. Gender, as socially constructed,
embodies it, not the reverse. Women and men are divided by gender,
made into the sexes as we know them, by the social requirements of
heterosexuality, which institutionalizes male sexual dominance and female sexual submission. If this is true, sexuality is the linchpin of gender
inequality.32

Bem does give considerable attention to compulsory heterosexuality as
a form of gender inequality, but in general she centers her theory
around the problems surrounding childbearing, childrearing, and
equality in the workplace. Yet the socialization of women as sexual
beings would fit nicely into Bern's gender schema theory, helping to
explain why women are such frequent victims of men's sexual oppression. As MacKinnon explains it, the socialization of women leads women to internalize men's image of sexuality, which is exactly what
Bem says women do with other aspects of becoming socially appropriate, feminine women. MacKinnon explains: "Gender socialization is
the process through which women come to identify themselves as sexual beings, as beings that exist for men. It is that process through
which women internalize (make their own) a male image of their sexuality as their identity as women. It is not just an illusion." 33
An interesting addition to Bern's book would have been a more
thorough analysis of how the gendered socialization of men and women contributes to rape, sexual harassment, prostitution, pornography, and violence against women. For example, Bern's theory of
women's internalization of the gender schema could have an impact
on a sexual harassment trial in which the defense argues that the woman "asked for it" by wearing traditionally gendered clothing - a
tight short skirt, spiked heels, and so on. In the first place, Bern's
theory could explain why women dress the way they do based on sex
typing. 34 More important, Bern's theory could be useful for analyzing
way? Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of Anita Hill, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER 402, 407-16 (foni Morrison ed., 1992); Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist
Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEXAS L. REv. 387, 394-96 (1984); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv.
589, 604-10 {1986); Wendy W. Williams, supra note 16, at 179-90 {discussing women's sexuality
and statutory rape laws).
32. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for
Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 533 {1982) (footnote omitted).
33. Id. at 530-31 (footnote omitted).
34. Cf. DUNCAN KENNEDY, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the Eroticization of Domination, in SEXY DRESSING ETC. 126, 162-213 (1993). Kennedy quotes a letter to the editor in
response to a controversial newspaper article about sexual harassment:
"Enjoying what one wears is one thing, but many misguided women dress provocatively to
seek attention and approval from men, not necessarily their advances. Men are told that
such outfits are a signal that advances are welcome. Why, after all, would any sane person
dress that way for her own comfort or pleasure?"
Id. at 177 (quoting Janice Zazinski, Letter to the Editor, On the Clothes Women Wear to Work.
BosroN GLOBE, Jan. 25, 1992, at 22).
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juries. Because both men and women on the jury presumably form
opinions of witnesses based on the results of gender schematicity, a
lawyer could attempt to present expert testimony explaining to the
jurors the way in which their own sex typing plays an improper role in
jury deliberations. Jurors tend to blame women for the way they
dress 35 and may not believe a "sexy dressing" woman when she testifies that harassing conduct was unwelcome. Bern's theory, however,
could explain to the jury both what was going on when the harassment
occurred and why the jurors themselves may believe certain untrue
things about the witnesses due to gender schematicity.
Bern's theory could also have an application for rape and domestic
violence cases. Properly developed and convincingly presented
through expert testimony, this is the type of theory that could replace
the much-criticized battered woman syndrome and rape trauma syndrome. 36 By stressing the way the jurors themselves make decisions
based on gender schematicity, attorneys could lead the focus of such a
defense away from what is wrong with the victim and toward what is
wrong with the way jurors make gendered decisions in deliberations. 37
Bern places herself into the feminist debate over the use of various
strategies for gender equality (pp. 127-32, 177-96). She criticizes both
the gender neutrality strategy of the 1970s - the sameness approach,
or gender minimizers - and the woman-centered approach of the
1980s - the difference approach, or gender maximizers. Bern criticizes the gender neutrality approach for its narrow-mindedness (pp.
177-85). She maintains that by claiming to be the same as men, women set themselves up for disaster in areas where women are different,
particularly in pregnancy. She also criticizes the sameness approach
for helping only those women who need it the least - those who are
"similarly situated" to men (p. 179). The 1980s glorification of women's differences was a backlash against the 1970s focus on gender
neutrality, androgyny, and women as victims.
Bern's critique of the 1980s approach clearly outlines the various
gender-maximizing theories - the biologically essentialist approach
35. See, e.g., id. at 176 ("[M]any women perceive violating the dress code in the direction of
being 'too sexy' as creating a particular risk of persistent propositions, unwanted touching, suggestive remarks, exhibitionism, obscene phone calls, and the like ....").
36. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work
and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battery, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986). In fact,
Bern's critique of androgyny is similar to critiques of the battered woman syndrome and the rape
trauma syndrome in that androgyny focuses too much on the personal rather than the political,
thus diverting attention away from more useful strategies. Compare pp. 123-24 with Schneider,
supra, at 212-22 and Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric
Labeling, and the Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 1994). See also Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993) (balding that a plaintiff in a sexual harassment trial need not
prove serious psychological injury, as "[s]uch an inquiry may needlessly focus the factfinder's
attention on concrete psychological harm, an element Title VII does not require").
37. See generally Stefan, supra note 36.
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espoused by Adrienne Rich and Mary Daly; the child development
approach seen in the work of Evelyn Fox Keller, Carol Gilligan, and
Nancy Chodorow; and the social psychological approach seen in the
work of Jean Baker Miller, Sarah Ruddick, Dorothy Smith, Hilary
Rose, Bettina Aptheker, Nancy Hartsock, and Sandra Harding (pp.
129-30). Although Bern commends the 1980s theorists for pulling the
feminist discourse away from gender neutrality and victimization by
exposing social oppression and patriarchy, she criticizes them for reproducing the lenses of gender polarization and biological essentialism
(p. 130). She argues that the woman-centered approach is simply the
flip side of current gender polarization, but with men rather than women being denigrated, which still leaves us with the politically dangerous idea that there are vast "natural" differences between men and
women. 38 MacKinnon points out the political danger of this approach: "When difference means dominance as it does with gender,
for women to affirm differences is to affirm the qualities and characteristics of powerlessness."39
Bern addresses several other key feminist legal debates in her book.
She comments on the controversial strategy of "special protection"
through protectivist legislation (p. 178). She exposes errors in the argument that women "choose" inequality by opting for lower-paying
jobs and childrearing instead of "men's" careers - the argument that
prevailed in the so-called comparable worth cases (pp. 177-78). One
area of feminism that Bern unfortunately skims over is multiple consciousness (pp. 182, 187, 191). Multiple consciousness seeks to make
feminism more inclusive by moving to the center those experiences of
women who are traditionally marginalized within the feminist movement, usually on the basis of race, class, sexual orientation, or disability.40 Bern raises the issue of women's differences in one paragraph,
and then, "[t]hese female-female differences notwithstanding," she defends the feminist struggle as valid (p. 182). She begins her next paragraph "[w]ith that said," as if the issues of racism, classism,
homophobia, and disability among feminists only merit two
paragraphs of discussion (p. 182). Once again, it appears that Bern
could use her schema theory to encompass these issues. Along with
the gender schema, are we not also raised with a racial schema, a class
schema, a physical ability schema?
38. See MACKINNON, Art of the Impossible, supra note 6, at 3 ("To treat gender as a differ·
ence ..• means to treat it as a bipolar distinction, each pole of which is defined in contrast to the
other by opposed intrinsic attributes.••• The idea of gender difference helps keep the reality of
male dominance in place.").
39. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 6, at 51.
40. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989-1990); Crenshaw, supra note 16; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. R.Ev. 581 (1990); Mari J. Matsuda, When the First
Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7
(1989).
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Bem promotes a unified feminist movement as the best policy goal
without truly examining the ways in which her theory could be of
further, more inclusive use. For example, what happens to her example of the incompatibility of work and childrearing when we consider
cultures with large extended families who share in the childrearing?
In what ways do androcentrism and gender polarization work with
racism to create unique problems for women of color?41 What happens to those women who are raised to be gender schematic in our
society but never can reach anything close to the gender "ideal" of
beauty because they are disabled, overweight, or not white? 42 In what
ways does gender schematicity encourage sex-typed women to "otherize" women who do not exemplify the traditional gender ideal? Bern's
theory of enculturation could provide an interesting framework for analyzing these issues.
Bern devotes serious attention to the issues of compulsory heterosexuality and homophobia. The issues surrounding homosexuality are
clearly an integral part of her gender schema theory. Bern exposes the
sexism inherent in homophobia,43 especially in her comparison of the
terms sissy and tomboy. As children, girls are allowed to cross gender
boundaries much more readily than boys are, which is evident "in the
merciless teasing of sissies, as opposed to the benign neglect or even
open admiration of tomboys. " 44 Bem illustrates this asymmetry with
the following example:
[A]lthough a girl can now wear almost any item of clothing and play
with almost any toy without so much as an eyebrow being raised by her
social community, let a boy even once have the urge to try on a princess
costume in the dress-up comer of his nursery school, and his parents and
teachers will instantly schedule a conference to discuss the adequacy of
his gender identity. [p. 150]

Bern points out that men are held to a nearly unattainable goal of
becoming "real men." In order to come close to that ideal, Bern argues, men dominate women as a way of feeling powerful, privileged,
and masculine (pp. 150-51).
41. See generally RACE-ING JUS'fICE, EN-GENDERING POWER, supra note 31.
42. See generally TONI MORRISON, THE BLUEST EYE (1970); NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY
MYTH (1991).
43. See also John Stoltenberg, Gays and the Propomography Movement: Having the Hots for
Sex Discrimination, in MEN CoNFRONT PORNOGRAPHY 248 (Michael s. Kimmel ed., 1991).
Those of us who are queer have a fairly obvious special interest in ending sex discrimination, because homophobia is both a consequence of sex discrimination and an enforcer of sex
discrimination. The system of male supremacy requires gender polarity - with real men as
different from real women as they can be, and with men's social superiority to women expressed in public and in private in every way imaginable. Homophobia is, in part, how the
system punishes those who deviate and seem to dissent from it. ..• Homophobia is central
to the maintenance of sex discrimination.
Id. at 251.
44. P. 150. For a grown-up example of this, compare any of the male figure skaters or ice
dancers with Bonnie Blair.

1940

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 92:1929

Bern's view of homophobia is politically useful: "[A]s much as the
fear or abhorrence of homosexuality may be a psychological problem
for many individuals, that fear or abhorrence is created by an institutional and ideological emphasis on gender polarization and compulsory heterosexuality" (p. 101). Bem objects to homophobia as a
concept that treats homosexual oppression as an individual pathological condition rather than as a social institution of oppression. This is
another area where Bem could have drawn on more recent events and
political strategies. For example, how does her theory work with the
current debate within the homosexual community of assimilation versus separatism? How would her strategy have contributed to the Clinton administration's decision to press "gays in the military" as its first
homosexual rights issue? How could her theory be used in the homosexual rights cases that are making their way toward the U.S. Supreme
Court?45 How might her theory convince voters in Colorado and
other states not to support laws opposing homosexual rights?46
Another concern with Bern's analysis of homosexuality is why she
omitted a serious discussion of the differences between lesbians and
gay men, especially in light of her heavy reliance on Adrienne Rich
(pp. 40, 99, 121-23, 129). One of Rich's main arguments is that
"[l]esbians have historically been deprived of a political existence
through 'inclusion' as female versions of male homosexuality. To
equate lesbian existence with male homosexuality because each is stigmatized is to deny and erase female reality once again."47 Similarly,
Sandra Harding points out how a distinctive lesbian epistemological
standpoint exposes androcentrism. 48 Bem mentions this issue briefly
in a parenthetical note as part of a discussion of the vocabulary of the
"gay" rights movement (p. 172), but she never returns to it. After
Bem devotes such attention to sissies and tomboys, one would have
expected a more thorough analysis of the political ramifications of
combining the lesbian rights movement with the gay rights movement
in such an androcentric, gender-polarizing society.49 For example,
gay men are not exempt from many of the privileges of an androcentric society just because they are in the sexual minority. 50
45. See Joan Biskupic, Gay Rights Activists Seek a Supreme Court Test Case, WASH. Posr,
Dec. 19, 1993, at Al.
46. See Valerie Richardson, Tough Challenges in Courts Stymie Gay Rights Backlash, WASH.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 1993, at Al.
47. Rich, supra note 18, at 649.
48. See HARDING, supra note 31, at 249-67.
49. See RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (Our)LAW 11-26 (1992). "Feminist legal theorists
also conceptualize lesbians with 'their men,' i.e., gay men. Astonishing in a discipline that dissects gender in evecy other aspect of life is the absence of a gendered perspective regarding sexual
orientation. For feminist legal scholars, gay men and lesbians is a single term." Id. at 22.
50. Some commentators have argued, as a matter of fact, that the gay male movement may
even be contributing to the subordination of women by supporting the pornography industry.
See, e.g., Stoltenberg, supra note 43.
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A final issue in this area that Bern could have explored further is
homosexuality as an identity. Bern claims that the politicizing of gay
and lesbian identities has been empowering but may be a historically
and culturally created fiction. She modifies this statement by ceding
that "they are fictions that come to have psychological reality if they
are institutionalized by the dominant culture" (p. 175). Given the
political and personal importance of homosexuality as an identity,
Bern could have expanded more on this idea. 5 1
Bern's writing style is clear and conversational, making the subject
she discusses appear deceptively easy. She seems serious about teaching her theories to the reader and about establishing a friendly rapport,
simplifying her language at points rather than attempting to impress
the reader with technical jargon. Throughout the book, Bern intersperses her theory with quirky personal facts and stories. One of the
best stories Bern tells is about her son Jeremy:
Jeremy ... naively decided to wear barrettes to nursery school. Several
times that day, another little boy insisted that Jeremy must be a girl
because "only girls wear barrettes." After repeatedly insisting that
"wearing barrettes doesn't matter; being a boy means having a penis and
testicles," Jeremy finally pulled down his pants to make his point more
convincingly. The other boy was not impressed. He simply said, "Everybody has a penis; only girls wear barrettes." [p. 149]

In her own family, she tried to teach her children at the earliest possible age that "being a boy means having a penis and testicles; being a
girl means having a vagina, a clitoris, and a uterus; and whether you're
a boy or a girl, a man or a woman, doesn't need to matter unless and
until you want to make a baby" (p. 149).
These stories, somewhat unexpected in a serious work by a leading
authority in gender roles, are actually a delight to run across. They
are engaging, making Bern appear human and personable. By showing
us how she and her family have been affected by the social construction of gender roles, she encourages us to question our own daily experiences through the framework of her theory. This rapport is
particularly comforting in light of the sections of the book that may
lead her readers to question their own gender identities or the way in
which they have contributed to the creation of traditionally gendered
identities in their own children. 52
In Bern's life and work, she attempts to promote gender subversiveness. Her vision of a feminist utopia would be a world in which
51. See generally Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory, and Psychoanalytic Discourse, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 324 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990).
52. See, e.g;, pp. 133-75 ("The Construction of Gender Identity"). Bern specifically asks us
to reconsider our personal psyches in her conclusion to the book. "Gender depolarization would
also require a psychological revolution in our most personal sense of who and what we are as
males and females, a profound alteration in our feelings about the meaning of our biological sex
and its relation to our psyche and our sexuality." P. 196.
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people look at one another, not primarily as "men" and "women," but
as human (p. 196). The question at this point is whether others can
use Bern's theories to reach that utopia. Bern's gender schema theory
may have great potential in the legal field - a potential that Bern, who
is not a legal scholar, does not develop. In this fashion, Bern's theories
may have made it out of the 1970s, and the 1990s may yet have a use
for them.
-
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